Project Abstract

My project focuses on the possibility of Kuhn poker possessing an evolutionarily stable strategy.Kuhn poker, a simplified version of poker, serves as an excellent model system for studying strategic interactions. Its simplicity allows for complete game-theoretic analysis while retaining essential features of more complex games. Understanding evolutionarily stable strategies in Kuhn poker has broader implications. It sheds light on real world scenarios where frequency dependent strategies play a role, such as cooperation, mate choice, and competitive interactions. In these scenarios, the fitness of a strategy depends not only on its absolute performance but also on its prevalence within the population.To establish the emergence of evolutionary stable strategies, I designed a genetic algorithm that evolves populations of decision trees for playing games of Kuhn poker. The genetic representation for these trees was designed using the strategy representation outlined by Harold Kuhn for Kuhn poker. The Nash equilibrium strategies for Kuhn poker did not establish evolutionary stability in my tests. Therefore, it can be assumed that Kuhn poker does not possess an evolutionarily stable strategy.

Keywords: Genetic Algorithms, Game Theory, Evolutionarily stable strategies

 Conference Details

Session: Poster Session A at Poster Stand 129

Location: Sir Stanley Clarke Auditorium at Tuesday 7th 13:30 – 17:00

Markers: Arno Pauly, John Tucker

Course: BSc Computer Science, 3rd Year

Future Plans: I’m continuing studies