Project Abstract

Amid increasing strikes on cryptographic protocols, we should take an interest in enhancing the reliability of security proofs. This element of safety evaluation is particularly prone to human blunders since errors in mathematical calculations are frequently passive and hence difficult to detect. Furthermore, the sheer complexity of protocols and extensions, as well as the length of security proofs, are major barriers. This encourages the utilization of automated security analysis tools and techniques to solve this challenge. We focus on evaluating Tamarin Prover while working towards an automated security analysis (Stadtl�?nder, 2019). This tool supports automated, unbounded, symbolic analysis of security protocols. It consists of expressive languages to represent protocols, adversary models, and properties. In our entire timeline, we will perform a clear analysis of the existing models as well as their alternatives. Thus, providing an overview of the tool & its application (Simon Meier, 2013).In conclusion to our comparative analysis and exploring the tools used in verifying security protocols, we will provide substantial knowledge regarding these tools’ existing capabilities and potential developments in the context of security protocol verification.

Keywords: Cyber Security, Automated Formal Verification, Security Protocols, Logic verification., Cryptographic Protocols, Formal Verification, Symbolic verification, Tamarin

 Conference Details

Session: Presentation Stream 23 at Presentation Slot 8

Location: College 127 at Wednesday 8th 09:00 – 12:30

Markers: Eike Neumann, Julian Hough

Course: MSc Cyber Security, Masters PG

Future Plans: I’m looking for work